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Abstract
From Bacteria To Bach and Back is an ambitious book that attempts
to integrate a theory about the evolution of the human mind with another
theory about the evolution of human culture. It is advertised as a defense
of memes, but conceptualizes memes more liberally than has been done
before. It is also advertised as a defense of the proposal that natural selec-
tion operates on culture, but conceptualizes natural selection as a process
in which nearly all interesting parameters are free to vary. This liberal
conception of key concepts creates space for philosophical innovation, but
occasionally makes the empirical content of the theory difficult to pin
down. Nevertheless, the book is full of scientific insight, wit, and humor.
It will undoubtedly become a cause of both controversy and inspiration
for those interested in naturalistic theories of human culture.
1 Introduction
Dennett’s new book is a captivating, lively, and expansive account of the evo-
lution of the human mind. It is a grand tour that begins with the origins of
organisms, ascends to the heights of human culture, and ends with vistas of a
future in which algorithms have begun to replace people as generators of cultural
novelty.
Although the book is about the evolution of the human mind, it is not a
work of evolutionary psychology. Dennett wastes little ink speculating about
the Pleistocene conditions that may have prompted domain-specific cognitive
adaptations. The opening lines of the book pose a pair of questions that provide
a more accurate indication of its focus: “How come there are minds?” and “How
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is it possible for minds to ask and answer this question?” The scope of these
questions is unwieldy, and, as usual, Dennett ignores disciplinary boundaries in
his attempt to supply an answer. The book weaves together a dumbfounding
range of science, but also a significant range of Dennett’s own philosophical
oeuvre. This gives it the feel of a magnum opus. This book shows us, more
transparently than do his previous works, how Dennett’s ideas about matter,
life, mind, and culture all hang together.
So how do they all hang together? We can start to answer that question
by identifying two unifying themes that figure as prominently in Dennett’s past
books as they do in this one. The first theme is the explanatory power of
natural selection. On Dennett’s view, natural selection is not only responsible
for generating the diversity of life; it is also responsible, by way of memes, for
generating the diversity of human culture. The second theme is an injunction
against the kind of magical thinking that often seduces those who contemplate
major evolutionary transitions. How did simple minds emerge from replicating
molecules? Cooperative minds from non-cooperative ones? Language-wielding
minds from non-linguistic ones? The more miraculous these transitions appear
to be, the more they invite magical thinking. Dennett’s project is to break
them down into theoretically manageable steps. The hopeful thought behind
the book seems to be that if we can demonstrate how life, mind, and culture
evolved gradually from less complex precursors, we can lay the groundwork for
a compelling naturalistic worldview.
Gaps and tensions are inevitable in a book with such ambitious scope. But
these are costs worth paying. The ambitious scope of this book provides a
unique vantage point from which we can assess the coherence of a package of
ideas that is, like the curvature of the earth, too vast to be visible under normal
conditions.
2 Competence Without Comprehension
After an introduction and a brief chapter arguing for relatively mild claims
about the importance of adaptationist reasoning in biology, the narrative grows
bolder. The third chapter, entitled, “The Evolution of Reasons” begins by
arguing that natural selection itself evolved from a precursor phenomenon called
differential persistence. Some kinds of physical structure stick around longer
than others. This fact - which Dennett calls differential persistence - can lead
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to interesting patterns in nature even in the absence of selection and design
processes. For example, the phenomenon of patterned ground, a process in
which regular geometric patterns of stones appear on a dirt surface without any
human or animal intervention, can be explained in terms of freeze-thaw cycles.
Ice forms between the dirt and the stones, and when it melts, it releases some
materials at a faster rate than others. If the ground is not perfectly level, this
differential release rate acts as a sorting mechanism that is capable of generating
interesting geometrical patterns.
The discussion of patterned ground serves two purposes that stand in mild
tension with one another. The first purpose is to show that the process of natural
selection has precursors; it did not appear out of thin air. The second purpose
is to show that, despite the existence of those precursors, natural selection itself
introduced a radical change in the manner in which complex systems come to be.
On the one hand, Dennett wants to emphasize the continuity between genuine
natural selection and other quasi-selective processes. On the other hand, he
maintains that genuine natural selection ushers in a unique and novel kind
of explanatory power. In Part I, this tension between novelty and continuity
remains mild. I mention it because a similar tension can be discerned in the
structure of the larger project, specifically with respect to Dennett’s embrace of
the “meme” label for his theory of cultural evolution. I’ll return to this criticism
in the conclusion.
So what is the radical change that natural selection is supposed to have
brought into being? Once replicating molecules emerge and natural selection
gets underway, reasons come into existence. For the first time, there is a distinc-
tion in nature between good and bad design. Natural selection magnifies and
refines that distinction. Thereafter, it becomes possible to say that a property
was selected for a reason, or an end. One might wonder whether Dennett is
simply equivocating on the term reason. Surely our reasons - the rational prin-
ciples underlying intelligence - are quite unlike the principles underlying those
features of the biological world that emerged without the benefit of rational
foresight.
Dennett avoids the charge of equivocation by emphasizing the distinction
between the existence of a reason and its representation in the mind of an
organism. He illustrates the point with a comparison between an elaborate
termite castle and Gaudi’s La Sagrada Familia, which have a superficially but
surprisingly similar outer form. There are reasons behind the elaborate shapes
in each case, and in each case, those reasons drive the behavior of the relevant
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artificer. The difference between the two cases is that, in addition to his capacity
to be moved by reasons, Gaudi had the power to represent, reflect upon, and
refine his reasons.
Dennett’s way of talking about reasons is more of a recommendation than it
is the conclusion of an argument. There is, however, a closely related claim which
serves as the primary thesis in Part I, and which Dennett defends explicitly. It is
the claim that cognitive competence does not require comprehension. According
to Dennett, this claim stands at the core of an intellectual revolution that was
instigated by Darwin, reinforced by Turing, and is still taking place today.
Where Darwin showed that there can be biological design without a designer,
Turing showed that there can be computation without a (human) computer.
Both insights are expressions of the more general claim that there can be - and
very often is - competence without comprehension.
What do these terms mean? By “comprehension,” Dennett means something
like human understanding - the ability to appreciate the principles that explain
why a thing is the way it is. “Competence” simply refers to an organism’s ability
to achieve a goal - to find food, impress a mate, or solve an equation.
It is tempting to impute comprehension to non-human animals engaging in
goal-directed behavior. But experimental manipulation reveals that often, there
isn’t much comprehension there at all. Niko Tinbergen’s work on supernormal
stimuli is a good example. Chicks seem quite clever when they pester their
mothers for food, but Tinbergen showed that this behavior is a disappointingly
inflexible instinct, governed by perceptual encounters with anything roughly the
size and shape of its mother’s beak (Tinbergen, 1953).
This, of course, is not news. But when we move toward impressing a mate
or solving an equation, the claim that comprehension is not required becomes
controversial. When an expert mathematician solves an equation, we are im-
pressed with her understanding of mathematical principles. But when Wolfram
Alpha does it, we are not tempted to infer understanding. Dennett’s claim is
controversial because he wants to suggest that lots of our rational competencies
are just like the competency of Wolfram Alfa. They emerge, without antecedent
understanding, from a range of relatively mundane competencies.
Thus far, the book might be described as an attempt to extend Morgan’s
Cannon to anthropology. It is as if Dennett wants to declare, “in no case is
human activity to be interpreted in terms of higher psychological processes, if it
can be fairly interpreted in terms of processes which stand lower in the scale of
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psychological evolution and development.”1 This is only partially right. One of
the tasks of the book is to do justice to those aspects of culture that are shaped
by rational insight, while simultaneously demonstrating that much of our culture
was shaped by a blind and gradual evolutionary process. The obvious question
raised by this juxtaposition is this: how do you get from mere behavioral compe-
tencies, like that of Tinbergen’s chicks, to intellectual comprehension, like that
of a skilled mathematician, by way of a gradual process?
3 On the Gradual Accumulation of Culture
The key to Dennett’s gradualism is his defense of cultural evolution in general,
and memetic theory in particular. Memes are units of cultural replication. Pur-
portedly, they constitute the structure that underlies cultural inheritance, just
as genes constitute the structure that underlies biological inheritance. Genes,
however, are easier to conceptualize than memes. Whereas genes are virtually
always obliged to take the form of a sequence of nucleotides within a DNA
molecule, memes face no such chemical constraints. According to Dennett,
memes are not even composed of physical parts. Memes are composed of infor-
mation.
To hard-nosed materialists, this claim is doubly bad: it invites confusion by
importing the dubious notion of information into the study of evolution, and,
at the same time, it spoils the analogy between culture and genetics. Dennett
dedicates a chapter to showing that the notion of information is not as dubious
as it may seem, and that, moreover, the analogy between genetics and culture
is in fact strengthened by the appeal to information, since, on his view, genes
turn out to be informational entities too.
What kind of information are we talking about? One might think that only
a quantitative conception of information will help to preserve the meme-gene
analogy. After all, genetics is a heavily quantitative discipline. On this point,
however, Dennett sides with philosophical tradition and insists that there is a
semantic conception of information that is distinct from the quantitative ideas
discussed in information theory.2 But Dennett’s analysis of semantic informa-
tion is not the usual one.
1This is a doctored version of one of the classical formulations of Morgan’s Cannon. The
original uses the phrase “animal activity” rather than “human activity.”(Morgan, 1903).
2See, for example, Piccinini and Scarantino (2011), Floridi (2017), and Godfrey-Smith
(2000).
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Social scientists often use the term “information” as a general term for propo-
sitional knowledge. In economics, for example, an agent has perfect information
about a good if she knows some relatively abstract facts about its price, quality,
and production method. According to Dennett’s analysis, semantic information
is more about know-how than it is about abstract facts. Information is whatever
helps an organism learn how to behave adaptively. To put it in Dennett’s own
exceedingly compact phrasing, information is design worth getting (p. 115).
Although the term “design” is quite vague, it highlights an idea that Den-
nett thinks is crucial to understanding how culture spreads: codeless transmis-
sion. Humans exchange information opportunistically. Unlike computers, we
can exchange know-how without worrying first about whether the information
is encoded in a format that its intended recipients will be able to interpret. To
borrow one of Dennett’s own examples, when Marco Polo (allegedly) brought
the design for noodles back from China, he did not need to express the recipe
in terms of a coding scheme that was already familiar to the Italians. He may
have simply brought back a jar of noodles, and put them in hot water. Clever
Italian chefs might have then reverse engineered the recipe, and their efforts
would have been copied and then recopied by other chefs, all without the use of
any conventionally defined symbols.
Students of information theory will notice a problem here. If cultural evo-
lution relies on copies of copies, and if the copying process is not regimented
by a coding system, won’t information be lost over time?3 The puzzle is solved
by acknowledging that human language does have some code-like structure, but
that this code-like structure is relevant to only one of two roles that language
plays in cultural evolution. Dennett illustrates the code-like role of language
with a discussion of phonemes, which, on his view, serve to digitize the auditory
representations of speech. Dennett captures the point nicely in the following
passage:
Without a digitization scheme, audible sounds are hard to re-
member, hard to reproduce, likely to drift imperceptibly away from
their ancestors, leading to the “error catastrophe” phenomenon, in
3The need to preserve transmission fidelity is precisely why information theory played
such a crucial role in the rise of communications technology. Part of the reason for the
enormous influence of Shannon and Weaver’s original book is the fact that it contained a
proof of the noisy channel coding theorem, which must have been an encouraging insight for
the struggling communications engineer. Why? Because it shows that, for any degree of noise
you may encounter, a code exists that will transmit your information without loss (Shannon
and Weaver, 1949).
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which natural selection cannot work because mutations accumulate
faster than they can be selected for or against, destroying the se-
mantic information they might otherwise carry (p. 200).
This passage describes the rationale behind the preservation of transmission
fidelity, which is the first role that language plays in cultural evolution. The
second role is exemplified by the phenomenon of pragmatic implication. If you
are meeting a friend for dinner, and send her a text saying that the subway is
delayed, she will know that you are going to be late, despite the fact that this
information is not literally encoded in the words you sent. So language helps
us transmit information in ways that transcend its encoding role. In addition
to functioning as an encoder of messages, it is also an enabler of inference; a
provider of clues.
When applied to the realm of cultural transmission, Dennett’s dual role
analysis of semantic information is compelling. When applied to the realm of
biological information transmission, it feels somewhat forced. On Dennett’s
view, biological information is just like cultural information: most of it is trans-
mitted by means of a copying process that is not regimented by a coding scheme.
Consequently, it too is threatened by the spectre of “error catastrophe.” Catas-
trophe in the biological case is avoided in much the same way it was avoided
in the cultural case: Dennett acknowledges the existence of a code-like struc-
ture, and then articulates two roles played by that structure, only one of which
is directly related to its code-like character. The first role, which is to pre-
serve transmission fidelity as information flows across biological generations, is
achieved by the replicable, code-like character of DNA. In this role, DNA really
does encode information, but its content is highly constrained, and concerns
only proximate matters such as protein construction.
DNA’s second role is to help transmit messages that are not literally encoded.
Dennett’s central example is the information implicit in bird DNA about how to
build a nest. Because there is no clean mapping between genes and nest building
behaviors, it is a mistake to say that nest building know-how is literally encoded
in the genome. Nevertheless, the transmission of that know-how relies on the
structural integrity and digitized character of DNA, much as the information
about your late arrival to dinner relies on the structural integrity and digitized
character of the English language.
One of the attractive features of this view of semantic information is that
it forges a deep connection between the dynamics of cultural change and the
7
dynamics of biological change: both are fundamentally informational, and both
are subject to natural selection. However, forging this connection requires us
to stretch our conception of semantic information close to its breaking point,
and perhaps a bit beyond it. To preserve the parallel between the dual role of
language and the dual role of DNA, we have to say that, although DNA does not
literally encode information about nest-building, it provides clues about how to
accomplish the job. The problem becomes apparent once we ask: who reads the
clues?
In order to “infer” nest-building know-how from the bird’s nucleotides, those
nucleotides must be embedded quite precisely, not only within the transcription
and translation machinery of the cell, but also within a massive conglomeration
of both developmental and environmental scaffolding. Can that scaffolding per-
form inference operations? I’m skeptical. There is nothing agent-like about it;
no physically unified thing in development or in the environment that responds
with much sensitivity and specificity to the relevant genes. The purported mes-
sage about nest building is therefore destined to remain unread.
Like beauty, semantic information is in the eye of the beholder. It isn’t there
if there are no eyes around to see it. Or, more generally, it isn’t there if there is
no receiver mechanism around to use it (Stegmann, 2009; Millikan, 1984).4 So,
the idea that DNA enables inference about how to build a nest - although an
improvement over the idea that DNA literally encodes that information - might,
nevertheless, be an over-application of semantic ideas.
3.1 Why believe in memes?
The central thesis in Part II is that the dynamical processes that generate hu-
man culture have changed over time. Early in our history, all cultural change
was Darwinian. Memes proliferated much like viruses do. Humans played the
role of host rather than steward. Once in a while, a mutant appeared that could
outperform other variants for space within human brains and amidst human ar-
tifacts. As culture accumulated and diversified, it became part of the fitness
landscape in which genetic evolution occurs. Human brains got better at imita-
tion, which increased meme diversity, and also got better at combining memes
into larger structures. These structures came to serve as conceptual tools that
enriched human minds, allowing humans to represent their own mental states
4There is, of course, room for debate about what it takes to play receiver to an informational
signal. See, for example, Cao (2012) and Rathkopf (2017). Also, see Shea (2012) for an
argument that developmental scaffolding can read genetic information.
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and become aware of their culture. Eventually, humans gained the power to
criticize memes, and finally, they gained the power to engineer new ones.
The first question to ask about this theory of culture is: why believe in
memes at all? Dennett emphasizes two answers. The first is that memes can
explain cultural adaptations without invoking teleology. Some cultural inno-
vations are clearly adaptive for those who adopt them, despite the fact that
no one understands why. Henrich (2015) discusses the example of ash cooking
among the Yanduwhandra tribe in eastern Australia during the middle of the
19th century. A large portion of their diet came from a tough sporocarp5 that
was ground into flour and then cooked according to an elaborate recipe. Only
a few steps in the recipe are necessary for making the food digestible, and no
individual in the tribe knows exactly which they are. It turns out that mixing
the flour with ash is a crucial step because it lowers the pH of the flour to a
tolerable level. This is an example of competence without comprehension, and
it calls out for explanation in the same way that a particularly well-adapted
anatomical form calls out for explanation in the biological domain. Moreover,
since cooking is not a human instinct, genetic explanations of adaptation are
ruled out. Meme theory is particularly well suited to explaining cases like this
because it satisfies the conditions required to produce natural selection. Memes
constitute a population of “individuals” with some variation, differential rates
of reproduction, and heredity (Godfrey-Smith, 2016). When these three condi-
tions are met, selection kicks in and adaptations appear, despite the absence of
rational guidance.
The second reason to embrace memes is the insight gained by asking ques-
tions about the fitness of memes, rather than than that of human genes or
lineages. When we see a universal cultural capacity that promotes human fit-
ness, it is tempting to infer that natural selection on genes must have shaped
it. In most cases, however, natural selection is too slow to explain cultural
change. Moreover, the focus on meme fitness provides a novel strategy for
explaining the spread of pathological cultural variants. Consider, for exam-
ple, the phenomenon of copycat suicide, sometimes known as the Werther effect
(Sisask and Va¨rnik, 2012). After controlling for the influence of common causes,
news about one teenage suicide appears to increase the probability of subse-
quent teenage suicides within a given country for a period of weeks to months.
Teenage suicide clearly doesn’t spread because it promotes reproductive suc-
5A sporocarp is a seed-like structure that is part of the life cycle of fungi and some plants.
In this case, it came from a species of fern.
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cess; nor does it spread because people suddenly acquire a rational appreciation
of its value. Meme theory provides an alternative proto-explanation: the idea
spreads because it has been designed to reproduce in its ecological niche, which
just happens to be constituted by a collection of human brains. This suggestion
is admittedly thin, but it may at least provide a framework within which more
detailed work in social psychology can be carried out.
Much of the account of memes so far is familiar, and accordingly, stands
open to familiar criticisms. But Dennett does offer a novel strategy for respond-
ing to them. Of particular importance are two new ideas: Darwinian spaces
(introduced in Chapter 7), and the idea that words are the paradigm case of
memes (introduced in Chapters 8).
3.2 Darwinian spaces
On Dennett’s view, there are lots of intermediate selection-like processes that
are neither wholly Darwinian nor wholly intelligent. The middle ground is rich,
and Dennett represents it by way of Peter Godfrey-Smith’s innovative Darwinian
space diagrams (Godfrey-Smith, 2009). These three-dimensional diagrams clev-
erly represent the many ways that population-level changes can be shaped by
the strategies that its members pursue.
Dennett discusses a handful of these diagrams, but one of them stands out
because it serves as a visualization of his central thesis about cultural evolution.
In that figure (13.2), the first axis represents the degree to which individuals in a
population comprehend the changes in their culture. The second axis represents
the role of randomness or chance in the discovery of new cultural variants. The
third axis represents the degree to which cultural change is directed from the top
down. Thus far, the debate about meme theory has focused almost exclusively
on small regions close to the maxima and minima of this space. In one corner,
near point < 1, 1, 1 >, we have paradigmatically rational phenomena, such as
a proof in number theory. Typically, the discovery and articulation of a proof
requires high comprehension, an efficient search of mathematical space, and
meticulous top-down control. At the opposite corner, near point < 0, 0, 0 >, we
have paradigmatically evolutionary phenomena, such as shifts in word pronun-
ciation. These shifts are often imperceptible to individual speakers; arrived at
by chance rather than search; and governed by a distributed, bottom-up process
of unreflective imitation.
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The novelty of Dennett’s introduction of Darwinian spaces into the discus-
sion of memes is that it allows us to make some principled claims about the vast
grey area between these extremes, and also, that it suggests a natural way of
characterizing some puzzling examples of cultural change that would otherwise
tug our intuitions in opposing directions.
Think, for example, of Hubel and Wiesel’s discovery of line detectors in V1,
which depended on the fact that a crack happened to appear in one of the glass
slides they used to project visual stimuli. Or think of a tech start-up that uses
machine learning techniques to identify new applications for cancer drugs. A
drug designed for pancreatic cancer, it turns out, has the unintended benefit of
helping to prevent dementia. Are these cases of rational insight, or blind cultural
evolution? In the light of Dennett’s Darwinian space diagrams, we can see that
there is no need to accept the forced choice implied by this question. Neither
case is fully rational, but the two cases deviate from rationality in interestingly
different ways. The first involves a high degree of comprehension and top-down
design mixed with a large dose of chance. The second involves an exhaustive
search of the data, which minimizes the role of chance. Moreover, the search for
the new drug application is directed from the top down. Nevertheless, because
nothing is yet known about the mechanism by which the drug prevents dementia,
there is little comprehension involved.6
The second and more important benefit Dennett derives from his use of Dar-
winian spaces is that it allows him a novel response to one of the most common
criticisms of meme theory: the idea that too much of human culture bears the
imprint of rational decision-making to plausibly be explained by natural selec-
tion on memes. This criticism, which has been advocated by Steven Pinker
among others (Pinker, 1997), presumes that rational and evolutionary mecha-
nisms of change are strictly mutually exclusive, so that each new example of a
rationally designed cultural variant weakens the case for meme theory. In light
of the Darwinian space diagram, Dennett can respond that rational insight is
an extension of meme theory rather than a refutation.
To the extent that rationally directed cultural innovation becomes an im-
portant force in cultural change, natural selection drops out, but the memes to
which that process gave rise stick around, and constitute the raw materials from
6Evolutionary processes can explain the origin of a given variant as well as its distribution
within the larger population(Godfrey-Smith, 2009). In this pair of examples, I am focus-
ing on the question of origin, but a similar kind of novelty could be applied to distribution
explanations.
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which rational designs are made. A metaphor may help to illustrate the view.
Although the ingredients in a cake recipe cannot be distinguished once the cake
has been baked, it can be useful to know what they were. Similarly, although
rational reflection may blend and bake memes past the point of recognition, it
can be useful to know that the culture’s raw ingredients are thoroughly memetic.
Is this an effective reply to Pinker? Are memes a useful theoretical construct
even when describing cultural change that involves explicit rational control? The
cake metaphor suggests that perhaps there are contexts in which it is useful to be
told that a rational phenomenon has memetic origins. Which contexts? Dennett
suggests that often, cultural history is “written by the victors, triumphantly
explaining the discoveries and passing over the mistakes and misguided searches
(p. 309).” Here, then, is at least one context in which the meme concept may
be applicable, even when the role of natural selection is minimal. It offers
a corrective to “great man” cultural histories in which good ideas manifest
themselves inexplicably in the minds of the gifted.
3.3 Words and digitization
Another criticism, which Dennett attributes to Richerson and Boyd (2008), is
that cultural transmission does not admit of decomposition into the discrete,
faithfully transmitted entities that meme theory requires. Consider the common
phenomenon in which a teacher misspells a word, and a student corrects the
spelling in her notes (Claidie`re et al., 2014). Is this faithful transmission of a
discrete meme? Richerson and Boyd say that it is not. It is instead what they
call guided transmission, which must be distinguished from cultural selection
because it depends on the application of a rationally applied corrective force
(Richerson and Boyd, 2008, p. 69). Dennett, however, can describe this case
as one of faithful transmission because, on his view, mere subjective similarity
is sufficient to render two meme tokens members of a single type (p. 226). The
student recognizes that the teacher’s written representation of the word is similar
to one of the meme-types that have been established in her memory, and that
recognition makes it the case that the written representation is a token of that
type.
This aspect of Dennett’s view is unique, and it has some interesting con-
sequences. The first consequence is that memes are more digitized than they
may appear, because the correction-inducing norms of language sort meme to-
kens into reasonably stable types. This coheres nicely with Dennett’s analysis
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of information. Without such correction-inducing norms to preserve faithful
transmission of types, culture would succumb to error catastrophe.
The second, and perhaps less favorable consequence of the subjective simi-
larity view is that there will be a substantial amount of fuzziness around meme-
types, because individual people will make different similarity judgments. There
is a link here with the other aspect of Dennett’s theory of information - codeless
transmission.
In some cases - such as with judgments about word spelling - there will be
a lot of overlap between judgments about whether two meme tokens belong to
the same type. In other cases - such as with trends in fashion - there will be
substantial variability between similarity judgments. Where variability is high,
the intrinsic features of the meme are no longer predictive of its success. Success
will be driven instead by whatever contingent factors happen to be involved in
the disparate set of similarity judgments. Insofar as the population of people
who make these similarity judgments constitute the environment in which a
meme reproduces, this high variability scenario is one in which drift, rather
than selection, has become the driver of evolutionary change.
Unlike selection, drift cannot explain adaptation. However, the capacity to
explain undirected adaptation was Dennett’s primary reason for taking memes
seriously. This is an interesting result. In order to decide whether to accept
Dennett’s view of memes, we should want to know more about the uniformity
of people’s similarity judgments. In those domains where similarity judgments
are diverse and disorganized, meme theory has less application.
3.4 On the evolution of language
The evolutionary transition that led most directly to the rise of cumulative cul-
ture is the emergence of human language. Dennett applies his theory of memes
to construct a well-informed but speculative account of language evolution, de-
signed to expose some of the smaller evolutionary transitions that must have
occurred along the way.
There is a general chicken-and-egg problem that all theories of language evo-
lution must confront. Cognition and linguistic behavior depend on one another.
If you take one away, the result seems to be either inexpressible thoughts or
meaningless expressions, neither of which seem to offer much adaptive advan-
tage, and neither of which, therefore, seem capable of getting the evolutionary
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ball rolling. On Dennett’s view, adopting the meme-first perspective makes this
puzzle tractable.
Dennett argues that our most recent alinguistic ancestors must have had
some basic imitative abilities. Once that assumption has been made, the next
question is usually about what additional competencies humans must have
arisen in order for language to get a foothold. For Dennett, the more press-
ing line of inquiry concerns possible vulnerabilities human brains displayed that
made them, collectively, an appropriate niche in which memes could thrive. The
shift is subtle but important: once made, the temptation to speak of the discov-
ery (or worse, the invention) of words disappears. Words are like the symbiotic
bacteria in our guts. They colonized us long ago, without our awareness. Occa-
sionally, our uncomprehending vocalizations turned out to be helpful, perhaps
in hunting and scavenging; perhaps in sexual selection. Words became a synan-
thropic species whose evolutionary interests were aligned with our own often
enough to become a permanent part of the human way of life.
Once a stable colony of words has established itself, two kinds of selection
drive the trend towards complex morphology. The first of these is a trend toward
meme diversification, itself driven by the meme’s interest to “distinguish itself
from the competition,” without diverging so radically from established vocal
forms as to become unpronounceable (p. 268). At the same time, given resource
constraints in human brains, there will be selection for meme-variants that are
amenable to efficient neural storage. Under these conditions, natural selection
will “discover” the virtues of combinatorics, much as communications engineers
have done when trying to find efficient ways of storing data. In my view, this
is an area where the memetic perspective is particularly insightful. At the very
least, Dennett’s meme-centric view provides a valuable how-possibly sketch of
the evolution of morphology that deserves to be developed and tested.
4 Intelligence and its Future
The last third of the book, comprised of just two chapters, is relatively short.
The first chapter is about the relation between culture and consciousness. To
many philosophers, consciousness is the most private of all possible phenomena.
But on Dennett’s view, which echoes Dan Sperber and Hugo Mercier’s recent
work (Mercier and Sperber, 2011), it has deeply social roots. Our ability to rep-
resent our own thoughts developed in response to selection pressures associated
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with communication, and in particular, in response to the payoffs of persuasion.
To persuade others, we must offer them a coherent narrative in which inconsis-
tency is either removed or made obscure. That narrative becomes a perspective
on the world; a reflective variety of self-awareness that no other animal has.
The final chapter uses the memetic perspective to shed light on future trends
associated with artificial intelligence. In one sense, the chapter departs dramat-
ically from the rest of the book, which is about how culture arose from its
biological roots in the past. In another sense, however, the discussion of AI
is a natural extension of the trajectory Dennett has described thus far. The
main idea is that very recently, there has been a reversal in the trend that has
long dominated the evolution of culture. Culture began as a product of a thor-
oughly Darwinian processes, but increasingly came to be steered by rational
control and human comprehension. The process of cultural change became, in
Dennett’s phrase, de-Darwinized.
With the advent of deep learning and genetic algorithms, however, some
aspects of cultural change are becoming re-Darwinized. New car designs, for
example, are selected by machine learning algorithms for reasons that human
engineers can’t precisely articulate (Volodymyr et al., 2013). Perhaps more im-
portantly, the computer simulations we rely upon to predict climate change and
other complex systems give us results for reasons that can be “epistemically
opaque” to the very teams of scientists who built them (Humphreys, 2009).
Although Dennett is not worried about runaway artificial intelligence or dooms-
day scenarios, he is worried that a world in which technology development has
become too Darwinian might be one in which it is impossible to comprehend
our own creations.
5 Back to Memes
From Bacteria to Bach and Back defends an evolutionary theory of culture that
is packaged and sold under the label of meme theory. However, part of Dennett’s
defensive strategy is to broaden the meaning of the term “meme” so that the
substantive differences between his views and those of other theories of cultural
evolution that reject the meme label, such as that of Richerson and Boyd (2008),
become difficult to discern. At one point, Dennett says, in a formulation that
could have been from Heidegger, that a meme is a way (p. 206).
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Many authors, including Sperber (2000) and Lewens (2015) have argued that
meme theory only makes sense if cultural individuals replicate in a strict sense.
On their view, mere reproduction is insufficient. To see the difference, consider
what happens when you use a music recognition app, such as Shazam. The
app identifies a song, and you then purchase the song from iTunes, say. This
replication process is unlike biological information replication, because the form
of the parent is not a direct cause of the form of the offspring. Rather, each copy
inherits its form from the original studio track. Sperber calls cases like these
“triggering reproduction,” and argues that they have the wrong causal structure
to count as cases of meme transmission. For Dennett, however, they are perfectly
good examples of meme transmission. He says: “...triggering reproduction is
itself, if not parenting at least a bit of midwifery, making a contribution - perhaps
a biased contribution - to the further reproduction of the type” (p. 245-46). For
Dennett, the deep metaphysical truth about parent-offspring relations is either
futile or unimportant.
By defending this pragmatic view of parentage, Dennett seems to reject
what other authors consider an important necessary condition on memes. So
why insist on the label? As far as I can tell, Dennett has two reasons. First, he
thinks that asking questions about selection on cultural individuals, rather than
biological individuals, is often eye-opening. Since framing cultural change in
terms of memes steers us toward those questions, the meme idea is theoretically
valuable. On this point, Dennett has me convinced.
Nevertheless, this perspective shift is afforded by the other established terms.
For example, according to Tim Lewens’ (2015) helpful taxonomy of cultural
evolutionary theories, Dennett’s theory would be categorized as “selectionist”
rather than memetic (if it weren’t for his explicit embrace of the term.) So there
must be another reason. I suspect it is the fact that the term “meme” reinforces
the impression of theoretical continuity between biology and culture. Like genes
and organisms, and to a lesser extent, like groups and germ-line cells, memes
are just another one of the many kinds of object upon which natural selection
blindly works its magic. That is a seductively simply way of framing the big
picture. However, as Dennett himself clearly argues, it isn’t quite correct. Much
of cultural change has been de-Darwinized. Often, its dynamics is driven, not by
natural selection, but by alternative, quasi-selective processes. This brings us
back to a comment I made near the outset about a trade-off between emphasizing
the explanatory novelty of natural selection, and emphasizing the continuity
between natural selection and quasi-selective processes. In this book, Dennett’s
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approach assigns greater weight to continuity. After reading it, I’m tentatively
more open to using the meme label in contexts in which natural selection does
not play a role, but suspect that the primary application of meme theory will
always be cases in which comprehension is low and replication is strict.
Regardless of the range of phenomena to which the meme label is applicable,
Dennett has used the label effectively, and shown that the evolutionary approach
to culture has far more to offer than its detractors have supposed.
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